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Corporations and the Limits of State-Based
Models for Protecting Fundamental Rights in
International Law
DAVID BILCHITZ*
ABSTRACT

At the heart of international law lies a central tension. On the one
hand, the fundamental rights recognized in internationaltreatiesprotect
the fundamental interests of individuals, obligating all actors who can
affect these rights. One the other hand, internationallaw has often been
conceived of as a system in which the only legitimate actors are states. In
turn, only states can be bound by the fundamental rights obligations in
international treaties. To address this tension, two models have been
proposed. The first is an "Indirect duty" approach, whereby the state
remains the primary duty-bearer and must itself "create"the obligations
of nonstate actors. The second is an "expanded state" approach, which
attempts to extend the idea of what falls within the domain of the state
and includes the corporatesphere therein. I argue that neither succeeds.
I contend rather that the state should be conceptualized as having a
"wholly public" character, whilst corporations are "partially public,
partiallyprivate" entities. Fundamental rights push us to recognize that
the state can no longer be conceptualized as the sole preserve of concerns
that have traditionally been classified as "public," though it retains a
distinct role from entities that have a private dimension. The "public"
dimension of private actors such as corporations gives good reason to
hold that they have direct fundamental-rights obligations under
international law. That conclusion helps to chart the contours of a

* Professor, University of Johannesburg; Director, South African Institute for
Advanced Constitutional, Public, Human Rights and International Law; SecretaryGeneral, International Association of Constitutional Law. I am grateful to Prof. Daniel
Augenstein and Prof. Hans Lindahl for inviting me to participate in an intensive two-day
colloquium on the topic "Global Human Rights Law and the Boundaries of Statehood," and
I would also like to thank them and other participants for their comments which have
helped to improve this article. I would also like to thank the highly professional editorial
team of the IJGLS for their suggestions and excellent work on the article.

Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies Vol. 23 #1 (Winter 2016)
© Indiana University Maurer School of Law

INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIEs

23:1

revised conception of statehood fit for the twenty-first century, where
multiple overlapping forms of power impact upon the fundamental
interests of individuals.
INTRODUCTION

International law, as traditionally understood, is a system set up by
states to regulate the affairs between them. Since the Second World
War, states have committed themselves in a variety of international
instruments to ensuring that the fundamental rights of individuals are
realized.' This has led to an understanding that individuals are the
bearers of rights, and that states are the agents required to assume the
obligations that flow from these entitlements. Such state obligations
involve both duties to avoid harming rights (negative duties) as well as
duties actively to take measures to help ensure these rights are realized
2
(positive duties).
This traditional understanding of the state's role in relation to
fundamental rights 3 has been challenged in this globalized world by the
growth of a range of nonstate actors with the capacity to impact
significantly upon fundamental rights. These include multinational
corporations, nongovernmental organizations, and groups fighting in
armed conflicts. These nonstate actors create a number of difficulties for
the traditional view that states are the sole agents bound by
fundamental-rights obligations. If the traditional view is correct, then
1. The United Nations Charter already recognizes that the protection of fundamental
rights in the postwar world order is one of the key purposes of the United Nations. See
U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3.
2. As Henry Shue explains, "[t]he complete fulfillment of each kind of right involves
the performance of multiple kinds of duties." HENRY SHUE, BASIc RIGHTS 52 (1980). This
notion has been taken up in international human rights law with various United Nations
Committees recognizing, for instance, that states have a range of duties to respect,
protect, promote, and fulfill fundamental rights.
3. Throughout this article, I will generally use the term "fundamental rights" instead
of "human rights," though the latter is the more familiar locution employed in
international law. I prefer the term "fundamental rights," as it simultaneously indicates
the foundational importance of the interests involved that these rights protect while
avoiding what I regard as a philosophical mistake of confining these rights only to
humans. It is arbitrary to restrict such rights to humans if other sentient creatures also
can possess many of these interests (as they do). For further elaboration on this, see David
Bilchitz, Moving Beyond Arbitrariness:The Legal Personhood and Dignity of Non-Human
Animals, 25 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 38, 52-53 (2009) ("[F]aith-based notions with no
philosophical grounding . . . cannot be used to ground our legal rules in a secular
constitutional democracy committed to a culture of justification."). I will only use "human
rights" in situations where there is the name of a treaty, a quotation, or a term of art
which cannot readily be replaced, such as "international human rights law."
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the discourse of fundamental rights should simply be inapplicable to
nonstate actors.
In Part I of this paper, I go back to the foundational question of why
fundamental rights are important. I argue that they matter primarily
because they protect the fundamental interests of individuals. With our
focus on the rights-bearer, the question of who bears the obligations in
relation to rights must always be determined in relation to the primary
goal of rights protection. That, I argue, in turn implies that rights place
certain obligations on nonstate actors. The basic normative
underpinnings of the idea of fundamental rights thus challenge the idea
that solely the state is responsible for addressing these interests. The
question then becomes how to reconcile this crucial element of rights
reasoning with the traditional state-centric approach to international
law.
In Parts II and III, I consider two different approaches to doing so
with a particular focus on multi-national corporations (MNCs). The
first, the "indirect duty" approach, attempts to extend the state-based
model to cover nonstate actors in an indirect manner: the state remains
the primary duty-bearer and must itself "create" the obligations of
nonstate actors. I argue that this approach either fails to adequately
capture the primacy of the rights-bearer or else collapses into a "direct
duty" model. It also cannot adequately capture the universality of
fundamental rights. The second, the "expanded state" approach,
attempts to expand the idea of what falls within the domain of the state
and includes the corporate sphere within that very domain. I argue that
this approach undesirably elides the differences between agents. As
such, it cannot adequately capture their distinctive natures or the
implications this has for their consequent obligations.
A strict distinction is often made between the realm of the "public"which is often seen to embrace only the domain of the state-and the
realm of the "private"--of which the corporate sector is regarded as an
exemplar. In Part IV, I contend that this distinction should be
conceptualized in a more nuanced manner: the state should be
conceptualized as having a "wholly public character" whilst corporations
are "partially public, partially private" entities. Fundamental rights
push us to recognize that the state can no longer be conceptualized as
the sole preserve of concerns that have traditionally been classified as
"public," though it retains a distinct role from entities that have a
private dimension.
In the Conclusion, I seek to bring these ideas together, concluding
that there are good reasons to jettison both the "indirect duty" and
"expanded state" models. Both models restrict obligations relating to
fundamental rights to the state. However, both the normative
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underpinnings of fundamental rights and the "partially public" nature
of the corporation provide good reasons to hold that corporations have
direct fundamental-rights obligations under international law. That
conclusion helps to chart the contours of a revised conception of
statehood fit for the twenty-first century, where multiple overlapping
forms of power impact upon the fundamental interests of individuals.

I. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND THE STATE: LOOSENING THE BOND
Traditionally, international law has been conceived of as a system in
which states are the primary actors. States negotiate obligations that
they voluntarily undertake through treaty commitments. Since 1945,
they have agreed to an extensive network of obligations to ensure the
realization of fundamental rights. In this section, I explore a tension
between the logic and normative underpinnings of fundamental rights,
and the focus of international law on states as the sole actors.
Historically, the concept of fundamental rights developed as a
protection for individuals against the overweening power of the state.
The power imbalance between the state and the individual could lead to
major intrusions on the freedom and well-being of the latter. This led
philosophers to defend the notion that the state should be constrained to
act only within boundaries that ensured the fundamental rights of
individuals were realized. 4 The first major legal document in this regard
was the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen. Enacted at
the start of the French Revolution, the Declaration attempted to correct
this imbalance.5 The document recognizes certain "natural and
imprescriptible rights of man," which include "liberty, property, security
and resistance to oppression." 6 It provides guarantees against arbitrary
imprisonment and the right to a fair trial. Importantly, it also
guarantees freedom of expression. If we consider this latter right, we see
a desire to protect the liberty of individuals to express their views
against the potential power of state organs to censor any perspective
regarded by public authorities as undesirable. In the eighteenth century
this was a matter of deep concern, in that state power could be used to
restrict the ability of individuals to express themselves against the
threat of serious consequences. This remains an important concern in
many parts of the world today.
Yet, what happens when that very liberty to express oneself is
threatened not by the state but by another powerful but private actor?
4. See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT para. 131, at 353 (Peter
Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690).
5. See THE DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND CITIZENS [Fr.], 26 Aug. 1789.
6. Id. at art. 2.
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Consider, for example, a situation where a large corporation implements
a policy that requires employees never to express their opinions without
permission from the directors of the company, on pain of dismissal. The
strong niche position of the company in the marketplace means that
employees in this industry have little opportunities to find work
elsewhere. Such a policy would pose a direct threat to the liberty of
individuals to express themselves, but is not caused by a state body. It
thus raises the fundamental question as to whether the right to freedom
of expression places obligations not only on the state but also on private
bodies such as corporations.
This question raises a foundational normative question as to why
fundamental rights are important and what the point of protecting them
is. Whilst I shall not provide an exhaustive discussion of various
theories of fundamental rights, the example above highlights a matter
of central significance. Individuals are concerned about fundamental
rights because of certain foundational interests in liberty and well-being
that rights safeguard. 7 Freedom of expression, for instance, is valued as
it protects an important interest individuals have in being able to freely
express their views.8 That is why it is troubling for the state to wield its
power to silence individuals. If that is so, however, then what matters is
that the individual interest underlying the right to freedom of
expression is protected. This logic, however, implies that it does not
matter which agents threaten such freedom of expression: if an agent
other than the state threatens this right, then that agent too must be
prohibited from doing so.
Rights thus are guarantees that protect certain important interests
that individuals hold dear. 9 Rights, however, are important and are
justified fundamentally because of the fact that they provide certain
guarantees for the rights-bearer,who is the normative focus. 10 Those
7. See, e.g., ALAN GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY 63 (1978) ("Since the agent
regards as necessary goods the freedom and well-being that constitute the generic features
of his successful action, he ...implicitly makes a corresponding right-claim.").
8. Freedom of expression in turn may be defended for both instrumental and intrinsic
reasons. For a famous treatise defending freedom of expression, see generally JORN
STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859).
9. See, e.g., DAVID BILCHITZ,POVERTY AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: THE JUSTIFICATION
AND ENFORCEMENT OF Socio-ECONOMIc RIGHTS 217 (2000); MARTHA NUSSBAUM, WOMEN
AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH 96-101 (2000) (arguing that
political rights, when viewed as "combined capabilities," are valuable in their own right).
10. This feature has been the basis of criticism of rights discourse. Compare ONORA
O'NEILL, TOWARDS JUSTICE AND VIRTUE 133-35 (1996) (criticizing rights discourse and
proposing a moral perspective focused on obligations rather than rights), with BILCHITZ,
supra note 9, at 72-74 ("Talk of duties alone fails to indicate that it is our connection to
others who have interests that is of critical importance and which imposes obligations
upon us.").
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guarantees require various agents to take certain actions and refrain
from others. It is thus crucial to consider the agents who bear the
obligations flowing from these rights: different types of agents may in
fact have distinctive obligations. Yet, in determining the obligations of
agents, the focus on the rights-bearer remains primary. Various
considerations must be canvassed in allocating obligations, including
ensuring the effective realization of these rights and creating a fair
distribution of responsibilities that takes into account the nature of each
type of agent. To focus on only one type of actor-the state-is fetishistic
in light of this logic, as there is no good reason why only the state
should be the sole focus of rights obligations. If nonstate actors such as
corporations imperil the realization of rights, we must consider how to
ensure that the threat they pose does not materialize, and we must seek
to determine their obligations in this regard.
Though the conceptual notion of fundamental rights historically
developed in relation to the tyranny of states, the logic underpinning it
requires a recognition of the obligations upon all actors that have the
capacity to impact upon such rights. Since the Second World War,
fundamental rights have been enshrined in a range of international
instruments and form part of international law. The first important
instrument that was developed in this regard was the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1949. The UDHR involved all
the peoples of the world reaffirming "their faith in fundamental human
rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal
rights of men and women."'" Of key importance is a commitment to
secure the "universal and effective recognition and observance" of the
12
rights in this declaration.
International law has traditionally been understood only to
recognize states as the key agents of international law with the capacity
to create and assume fundamental-rights obligations. 13 States, though,
have accepted a foundational notion of international law-fundamental
rights-that in its very logic requires recognition of the fact that all
agents, whether state or nonstate actors, can be bound by the
obligations they impose. There is thus an awkward co-existence that has
developed between a nonstate-centric idea (fundamental rights) within
a state-centric system (international law). How are we to conceive of the
obligations of actors other than the state in relation to fundamental
11. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A.
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).

Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.

12. Id.
13. See

JENNIFER A. ZERK, MULTINATIONALS AND CORPORATE SOcIAL RESPONSIBILITY:
LIMITATIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 73 (2006) ("It was generally

believed that only states could be 'subjects' of international law.").
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rights? In the next section, I discuss the first model, which has sought to
square this circle: the "indirect duty" model.
II. THE STATE AS PRIMARY AGENT AND THE STATE DUTY TO PROTECT

A. The Indirect Duty Model
The traditional doctrinal response to the problem that nonstate
actors can impact upon fundamental rights is to find a way to hold them
accountable without giving up on the idea that the state is the primary
agent bound by fundamental-rights obligations. The method of doing so
involves expanding the scope of the state's obligations in relation to
fundamental rights. The state not only assumes an obligation not to
violate rights itself (the duty to respect) and to provide concrete goods
(the duty to fulfill), but it is also required to ensure that other, nonstate
actors do not imperil the interests protected by fundamental rights (the
duty to protect). The state is thus responsible for imposing obligations
on nonstate actors that they would otherwise not have in relation to
fundamental rights and creating enforcement mechanisms to ensure
they are realized. 14 The contours of this duty are famously outlined in

Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras:
An illegal act which violates human rights and which is
initially not directly imputable to a State (for example,
because it is the act of a private person or because the
person responsible has not been identified) can lead to
international responsibility of the State, not because of
the act itself, but because of the lack of due diligence to
prevent the violation or to respond to it as required by
the Convention.... The State has a legal duty to take
reasonable steps to prevent human rights violations and
to use the means at its disposal to carry out a serious
investigation of violations committed within its

14. See generally Stephen J. Emedi, Note, Utilizing Existing Mechanisms of
International Law to Implement Human Rights Standards: States and Multinational
Corporations, 28 ARIZ. J. INT'L. & CoMP. L. 629 (2011) (arguing that the state, despite the
growing size and power of multinational corporations, still remains as the "actor that
needs to be targeted to stop [multinational corporations] from violating human rights");

Aoife Nolan, Addressing Economic and Social Rights Violations by Nonstate Actors
Through the Role of the State: A Comparisonof Regional Approaches to the 'Obligationto
Protect,' 9 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 225 (2009) (investigating the state's obligation to protect
economic and social rights against third-party actors as interpreted by four different
regional bodies).
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jurisdiction, to identify those responsible, to impose the
appropriate punishment and to ensure the victim
15
adequate compensation.
This idea has been adopted by other regional human rights
institutions and within the international treaty system. 16 The state's
duty to protect as understood in these international law instruments
appears to comprise several elements. The traditional doctrine that
states are the sole subjects or addressees of international law seems to
imply that a nonstate actor such as a corporation would not have any
obligations imposed by international human rights treaties. This
appears to create a lacuna, in that corporations may then face no
consequences for severe harms caused to individuals. To address this
problem and ensure that rights are protected, the duty to protect
requires states to take reasonable steps to ensure that third parties
such as corporations do not violate such rights. I shall refer to this as
the "indirect duty" view: whilst corporations, for instance, have no direct
duties in relation to fundamental rights, they have such a duty
indirectly through the state's framework of laws and regulations which
protect such rights. The state's first duty is thus to set up the legal
framework and regulatory structures that create obligations for third
parties in relation to such rights. It must then adopt all the measures
necessary to ensure enforcement of these laws, which must include an
investigation and an enforcement system. The state is thus, under this
conception, both the sole "originator" of obligations for third parties and
the main "enforcer" of those obligations. The individual has no claim on
a private actor, such as a corporation, outside the terms of a framework
set up and established by the state itself.

15. Veldsquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4,
172, 174 (July 29, 1988), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/b 11_12d.htm.
16. See Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) and Another v. Nigeria,
Comm. No. 155/96, 2001 AHRLR 60 para. 57 (ACHPR 2001) (citing Commission Nationale
des Droits de lHomme et des Libert6s v Chad (2000) AHRLR 66A (ACHPR 1995)),
http://www.chr.up.ac.za/images/files/publications/ahrlr/ahrlr 2001.pdf
at
available
("Governments have a duty to protect their citizens, not only through appropriate
legislation and effective enforcement, but also by protecting them from damaging acts that
may be perpetrated by private parties"); see also X and Y v. Netherlands, 91 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) (1985), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57603; Gen. Comment No.
15: The Right to Water (Arts. 11 and 12 of the Covenant), Comm. on Econ., Soc. and
23-24, U.N. Doc. E/C.1212002/11
Cultural Rights, 29th Sess., Nov. 11-Nov. 29, 2002,
(Jan. 20, 2003), available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/4538838d1 1.html.
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Individual
Fig. 1: The indirect duty relationship

B. Critiqueof the Indirect Duty Model
The indirect-duty view flows from particular assumptions about the
need to regulate the impact nonstate actors can have on fundamental
rights whilst retaining a state-based conception of international law. In
engaging critically with it, I shall focus particularly on the idea that the
state should be conceptualized as the "originator" of fundamental-rights
obligations between private parties.
First, let us turn to internal problems in the very logic of the case
for the indirect-duty view.1 7 States are tasked by international humanrights treaties to create the laws and regulatory frameworks that bind
third parties in relation to fundamental rights. The question that arises
is why states should bear any responsibility for regulating the behavior
of third parties who are agents separate from the state. It is readily
understandable why the state can be bound in relation to its own
actions in relation to individuals, but why must it assume some
responsibility for what others do or fail to do?
There are two types of answers that can be given in this regard: the
first flows from the importance and nature of fundamental rights, the
second from the very character and justification of the state itself (an
idea that I will develop in the next section). As we have seen, in relation
to the first answer, individuals, corporations, and nongovernmental
17. In the next few paragraphs, I attempt to elaborate and develop upon an argument
made much more briefly in David Bilchitz, A Chasm Between 'Is' and 'Ought?A Critique
of the Normative Foundationsof the SRSG's Framework and the Guiding Principles, in
HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF BUSINESs: BEYOND THE CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY TO
RESPECT? 107, 111-13 (Surya Deva & David Bilchitz eds., 2013).
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organizations all have the potential to affect the individual interests
protected by fundamental rights in serious ways. Since rights-bearers
and their interests are primary, a system concerned with the protection
of rights must place obligations on any actor that has the capacity to
imperil or affect the realization of rights. The state duty to protect is one
way of doing so, by placing obligations on the state to create binding
legal frameworks and enforcement procedures that place obligations
upon nonstate actors in relation to rights.
However, what is unclear is why we should follow an indirect route
at all for recognizing that all agents are bound by fundamental rights. If
the goal of rights-protection is to ensure the realization of rights, and
multiple actors can impact upon such rights, why then not simply
recognize that all actors who have the capacity to affect their realization
are under direct obligations in this regard? The indirect-duty approach
places the state between the individual and other actors, but it is simply
unclear why this is necessary, efficient, or desirable. The problem with
the indirect-duty view, then, is to see why it does not collapse into a
direct duty view: if protecting the fundamental interests of individuals
is the goal of rights-protection, then that would seem adequate to justify
placing direct obligations on corporations and other nonstate actors. The
doctrinal commitment to states as the sole subjects of international law
appears rigid, unjustified, and unconnected to the very normative
underpinnings of fundamental rights.
Moreover, it is hard to see why the state should have such a duty to
protect at all, unless there is some pre-existing reason to believe that
third parties are not entitled to violate the fundamental rights of
individuals at will. If a concern to protect rights-bearers and their
interests is at the foundation of fundamental-rights protection, then the
reason for the state's involvement in this area must be the fact that
private powerful parties can significantly affect the fundamental
interests of other individuals. If that is the case, however, it is unclear
why this does not in itself provide a sufficient reason for recognizing
obligations upon those powerful private parties themselves in relation to
other individuals.
This reasoning challenges the notion that the state should be
recognized as the "originator" of the fundamental-rights obligations of
nonstate actors. If the normative core of fundamental rights is the
protection of individuals and their fundamental interests, then those
rights are not created by the state but rather arise independently of the
existence of the state. States themselves recognize these pre-existing
rights in positive law (international or domestic), develop detailed
regulations around them, and help develop institutional mechanisms to
give effect to them. But they create neither the rights themselves nor
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the obligations flowing from them. Importantly, states-by signing the
international treaties that protect fundamental rights-provide legal
recognition for pre-existing moral rights, which they then undertake to
give effect to in their national systems and in their actions of an
international character.
The notion that the state is the "originator" of obligations for private
parties also has a number of undesirable implications. First, the idea
places the state in an extremely powerful position and suggests that it,
in some sense, lies within its discretion as to whether to impose
fundamental-rights obligations on third parties.18 The only reason the
state is required to do so is the international obligations it voluntarily
assumes in relation to other states. Yet, given the sovereign equality of
states, it may (at least theoretically) withdraw from these obligations. If
the state is the "originator" of fundamental-rights obligations for third
parties, then it may refuse to create them. This state of affairs then
leaves third parties to violate rights as they wish in the absence of state
action.
It also raises the question as to the source of the very obligations of
the state itself in relation to fundamental rights. Is the state the
"originator" not only of the obligations of third parties but also of its
own
obligations? In what sense are its own obligations binding in this
regard? Such obligations would stand on shaky ground if their only
basis were the voluntary commitment of the state itself. This idea is
also at odds with the recognition that it would be important to protect
fundamental rights even if the state refused to bind itself to such
treaties. The very idea of fundamental rights arises from the importance
of individuals and the various characteristics that are fundamental to
them. 19 Individuals have these interests prior to the state recognition
thereof, and their desire to have these rights protected is part of their

18. For a philosophical tradition that suggests this notion, see Jeremy Bentham,
Anarchical Fallacies, in NONSENSE UPON STILTS 46, 69 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1987)
(accepting only legal positive rights recognized by the state and contending that natural
rights make no sense--"from real laws come real rights"). It is quite unclear why Bentham
objects to moral rights if they are understood as the claim that an individual "ought" to
have certain legal rights. See Jeremy Waldron, Jeremy Bentham's Anarchical Fallacies,in
NONSENSE UPON STILTS, supra, at 39-45; see also Amartya Sen, Elements of a Theory of
Human Rights, 32 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 315, 324-28 (2004).
19. There are disputes in the philosophical literature as to which characteristics
matter. See, e.g., JAMES GRIFFIN, ON HUMAN RIGHTS 149-58 (2008) (focusing on the
importance of autonomy); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 90-95 (1971) (focusing on
the importance of primary social goods); NUSSBAUM, supra note 9, at 96-101 (focusing on
the importance of combined capabilities).
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reason for accepting state authority to begin with.20 Recognition of these
rights, therefore, should not be seen as a choice of the state. The state's
very normative legitimacy depends upon recognizing and giving effect to
them. 21 The state should thus not be understood to be the "originator" of
fundamental-rights obligations. Rather, such obligations set the very
goals of and constraints on legitimate state action.
A second major set of problems arises from the idea of the state as
an "originator" of fundamental rights obligations. If the state fails to
implement a legal framework that binds private parties, then the
inference would be that corporations and other private actors lack any
obligations in relation to fundamental rights. There are many parts of
the world today in which states are weak or otherwise fail adequately to
give effect to their duty to protect. In these parts of the world where
there is a lack of regulation, it would seem then that powerful private
actors are under no obligations in relation to the fundamental rights of
other individuals. Yet, once again, this is wrong if fundamental rights
attach to rights-bearers because of their inherent worth and dignity,
and protect their significant interests.
The idea of the state as "originator" of fundamental-rights
obligations undermines another key feature of fundamental rights: the
fact that they universally apply to all individuals with those interests. 22
If the state were the "originator" of fundamental-rights obligations, such
obligations might well fail to be recognized universally. Moreover, a
state that failed to create such obligations could not justifiably be held
liable for any fundamental-rights violations. Such a doctrine would also
preclude liability before any national or international tribunal for
violations of fundamental rights by private actors who acted in
jurisdictions that failed to impose fundamental-rights obligations on
them. The universality of rights protection will also be undermined by
this idea in that different states will "create" different legal frameworks
that impose different obligations on private actors. Such a scenario
would be extremely undesirable in that it would lead to a situation in
which corporations would have certain fundamental-rights obligations
in some states and not others. In some cases, this would lead to a
situation in which corporations lack important obligations, placing
rights in jeopardy. That would fail to address the key goal of

20. This idea is deeply rooted in the social contract tradition of philosophy. See, e.g.,
LOCKE, supra note 4; see also JEAN-JACQUEs RoussEAu, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 27-30

(Charles Frankel trans., Hafner Pub. Co. 1947) (1762).
21. See Frank I. Michelman, Socioeconomic Rights in Constitutional Law: Explaining
America Away, 6 INT'L J. CONST. L. 663, 675-76 (2008) (explaining how the Rawlsian
theory of legitimacy explicitly applies in the context of fundamental rights).
22. See JACK DONNELLY, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 18 (2d ed. 1998).
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fundamental-rights protection outlined above, namely, to ensure
protection for the fundamental interests of individuals.
Indeed, this is not just a theoretical problem that could arise. With
the advent of globalization, many corporations shifted their
manufacturing operations to countries (such as China) and regions
(such as Southeast Asia) where minimum labor rights and standards
were not incorporated into labor laws. The lack of these protections has
led to exploitation and misery for many workers. 23 Yet, the
multinational corporations in question might argue that, since these
countries have not created labor protections for their workers, the
corporations have done nothing wrong and have not violated any
fundamental rights, as they lack any obligations in the absence of state
regulation. An understanding of the impact of their activities on the
fundamental interests of workers would, however, testify otherwise. The
universality of international fundamental rights thus requires
recognizing that there are common standards applicable across the
globe, and that international fundamental rights can be violated by
corporations even in circumstances where states have failed to
implement adequate national legal frameworks to grant them
recognition.
A variant of this problem arises from the manner in which the duty
to protect has been conceptualized in international law. The duty
requires the state, when setting up legal frameworks and enforcement
mechanisms, to exercise reasonable due diligence to ensure that third
parties do not violate the rights of individuals. State liability is thus not
absolute in relation to third parties, as seems fair: the state cannot
completely control the actions of all nonstate actors. Moreover, if the
state were the originator of such obligations, it would need to establish a
rather exhaustive set of requirements for such actors if it is to exercise
its powers effectively. The possibility, however, exists that a
corporation, for instance, will violate rights in a new and unexpected
manner, despite the reasonable actions of the state in developing a legal
framework to regulate corporate behavior. In such a scenario, victims of
the rights violations may not be able to show that the state has been
unreasonable in its actions. However, if the corporate behavior has not
been proscribed by existing legal regulations, then it could also not be
challenged, as it lacks any direct obligations other than the ones
imposed by the state. The only way to solve this problem is to avoid
conceptualizing state action as being the "originator" of corporate
23. See generally Bin Wu & Yongniang Zheng, A Long March to Improve Labour
Standards in China: Chinese Debates on the New Labour Contract Law, 39 CHINA
BRIEFING SERIES (2008) (U.K.), available at http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/cpi/
documents/briefings/briefing-39-china-new-labourcontract-law.pdf.
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obligations in the first place, and to recognize that fundamental rights
at the international level directly place obligations upon corporations,
these obligations being amenable to application in new scenarios where
the underlying interests are affected negatively.
The discussion thus far also highlights an important relationship
between a normative obligation and the right to an effective remedy.
The right to a remedy is recognized as a self-standing right in
international human rights law. 24 At the same time, the right to a
remedy is in some sense derived from a prior recognition of obligation:
one can only acquire a remedy if a prior duty has been breached. The
duty to protect once again suggests that the only remedies that lie
against corporations for wrongs they commit in relation to fundamental
rights can arise from obligations that particular states have created in
their laws and regulatory frameworks. The ability to access a remedy
thus becomes contingent upon the relative strength of the laws in
particular states. Scant possibilities for a remedy are offered to victims
of rights violations living in states that have not recognized corporate
obligations for rights violations.
Indeed, this lacuna exists within the UN Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights. 25 The Guiding Principles rest on three
pillars: the state's duty to protect individuals from rights violations by
corporations; the corporate responsibility to respect and avoid harm to
the rights of individuals; and the importance of having access to a
remedy for victims of rights violations. The corporate responsibility to
respect, however, is expressly understood in the document as not being
a legal responsibility. 26 Yet, the access-to-remedy pillar recognizes the
importance of legal remedies where the rights of victims have been
violated. The framework thus operates as follows: since corporations
have no direct legal obligations to individuals, no legal remedy can be
claimed against them unless the state has created obligations for
corporations and these obligations are breached. Once again, this leaves
individuals without a remedy against the perpetrator of the violations
in circumstances where the state fails to regulate and create such
obligations.
24. See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, supra note 11, art. 8; International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), art. 2(3), U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966), available at http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/
ccpr.aspx.
25. See Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations 'Protect, Respect and
Remedy'Framework, U.N. Doc. AIHRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) (by John Ruggie).
26. See id. at 13-14 ('The responsibility of business enterprises to respect human
rights is distinct from issues of legal liability and enforcement, which remain defined
largely by national law provisions in relevant jurisdictions.").
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I have argued that there is good reason to jettison the idea implicit
in the indirect-duty model that states are the "originators" of the
obligations of private actors in relation to fundamental rights. This
argument should not be misconstrued as an argument against the
state's development of detailed positive regulations governing the
relationship between corporations and other private actors. It simply
means that corporate obligations in relation to fundamental rights
precede and must guide such regulation. The moral character of
fundamental rights predates the state, and their legal normativity flows
both from this moral source as well as from the nearly universal
recognition of fundamental rights as law at the international level by
states.
III. EXPANDING THE STATE
I have considered some of the difficulties with an indirect-duty view
of the fundamental-rights obligations of corporations as well as the
conception of the state that it assumes. If we wish to modify or reject
this approach, what are the alternatives? The possibility I consider in
this section seeks to retain the traditional approach of international law
by conceiving of the state as the primary subject and bearer of
obligations. However, it attempts to address some of the challenges
discussed above by expanding our understanding of what, in fact,
constitutes the state. This approach includes nonstate actors within the
domain of the bearers of obligations in respect of fundamental rights by
virtue of reconceptualising them as part of the state itself (and thus as
state actors).
A. PrivateEntities as Part of the State
To understand this approach, it is instructive to consider the AlPay
case 27 decided recently by the South African Constitutional Court. An
agency of the South African government issued a tender that required
bidders to propose methods whereby social grants would be paid to
individuals. These grants are relied upon by over fifteen million socially
vulnerable people as their means of living. One tenderer, Cash
Paymaster, was awarded the grant and began to deliver the services. An
unsuccessful tenderer, AllPay, challenged the tender award based on
27. There were two judgments in this case. See AllPay Consol. Inv. Holdings v. Chief
Exec. Officer of the South African Social Security Agency 2014 (1) SA 604 (CC) (S. Mr.)
(dealing with validity of the tender itself); AllPay Consol. Inv. Holdings v. Chief Exec.
Officer of the South African Social Security Agency 2014 (4) SA 179 (CC) (S. Afr.) (dealing
with the appropriate remedy).
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various irregularities in the tender process. The Constitutional Court
found that these irregularities did in fact render the award of the tender
to Cash Paymaster invalid.28 A major difficulty in this case, however,
arose as to the remedy the court should grant. If Cash Paymaster's
services were to have been terminated, millions of people could be
placed at risk of not receiving their social grants. The court in the end
decided that, despite the invalidity of the tender, Cash Paymaster was
under an obligation to continue to provide the payment services it
offered.
The court reasoned that, whilst Cash Paymaster was a private
company and not under the control of the state agency in question, "the
function that it performs - the country-wide administration of the
payment of social grants - is fundamentally public in nature."29 The
public nature of this function and its importance meant that, for
purposes of this contract, Cash Paymaster had become an organ of
state:
When Cash Paymaster concluded the contract for the
rendering of public services, it too became accountable to
the people of South Africa in relation to the public power
30
it acquired and the public function it performs.
The South African Constitutional Court here effectively reclassifies
the boundaries of the state to include private companies that are
performing public functions. Similar judgments and approaches can be
found in other jurisdictions. 31 Under this model, corporations that had
28. Allpay 2014 (1) SA 604 (CC) at para. 93.
29. Allpay 2014 (4) SA 179 (CC) at para. 52.
30. Id. at para. 59.
31. See, e.g., R v. Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex parte Datafin PLC [1987] 1 QB
815 (Eng.); Murray Hunt, Constitutionalism and the Contractualisationof Government in
the United Kingdom, in THE PROVINCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 21, 28 (Michael Taggart
ed., 1997) (describing ex parte Datafin PLC); see also Stephen Ellmann, A Constitutional
Confluence: American "StateAction" and the Application of South Africa's Socioeconomic
Rights Guarantees to Private Actors, 45 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 21 (2001) (discussing state
action doctrine jurisprudence in the United States). Compare McKinney v. Univ. of
Guelph, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229 (Can.) (emphasizing the presence of governmental control in
Canada's state action doctrine), and Stoffman v. Vancouver Gen. Hosp., [1990] 3 S.C.R. 48
(same), with Eldridge v. B.C. (Att'y Gen.), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 624 (holding that a failure to
provide medical interpreter services for the deaf does not violate the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms). A similar approach has been adopted by the European Court of
Human Rights in several cases too. See, e.g., Yershova v. Russia, App. No. 1387/04, 2010
Eur. Ct. H.R. 1; Wog v Poland, App. No. 22860/02, 2006 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1; Novoseletskiy v.
Ukraine, App. No. 47148/99, 2005 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1; Radio France v. France, App. No.
53984/00, 2004 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1; Costello-Roberts v. United Kingdom, App. No. 13134/87,
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conceived of themselves as private actors are transformed into public
actors with concomitant direct obligations to individuals.
Such a model offers a response to the growth of powerful nonstate
actors within the traditional state-centric approach to international law.
To address the obligations of these nonstate actors in relation to
fundamental rights, we simply reconceptualise the nonstate actors (or
their functions that have an impact on fundamental rights) as
essentially public in character and thus as part of the state.
32
This model can be represented in a simplified form pictorially:

State
Private Entities

Individuals

Fig. 2: The "Expanding State" Model
B. Is the Expanding-State Model Desirable?
It is true that, increasingly, corporations are performing functions
traditionally assumed by the state.33 The question then arises as to
1993 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1. The European Court of Justice has also extended the responsibility
of the state in a like manner in Case C-188/89, Foster v. British Gas PLC, 1990 E.C.R. I3313. For the European context, see the report by DANIEL AUGENSTEIN, STATE
RESPONSIBILITIES TO REGULATE AND ADJUDICATE CORPORATE ACTIVITIES UNDER THE

EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (Apr. 2011), available at https://pure.uvt.nl
portal/enpublications/state-responsibihties-to-regulate-and-adjudicate-corporateactivities-under-the-european-conventin-on-human-rights%2866a0461-6af6-419e-8c4d55a930818438%29.html.
32. Variants of this model might recognize some private entities as separate from the
state but having no obligations to individuals.
33. There is an expanding body of literature considering this question. See, e.g.,
ROBERTO UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 193 (1976); Stephen Sedley, Foreword,in THE
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whether it is desirable-for purposes of recognizing obligations upon
corporations for fundamental rights-to reconceptualise them as wholly
public entities in this way. I argue that this approach should not be
adopted for several reasons.
First, the decision relating to how far the scope of the state extends
is extraordinarily complex. Many states have multiple relationships
with various forms of corporate actors. For example, several
corporations today run prisons, a function that would traditionally be at
the heart of the state's responsibility to enforce its laws. In terms of the
functional test outlined by the South African Constitutional Court, it
would indeed seem that such corporations become part of the state for
purposes of exercising those functions. However, let us imagine that the
state retains control of several prisons but employs a private catering
company to provide meals for prisoners. Prisoners, as a dependent
group, are wholly reliant upon the food provided to realize their right to
food. Is the catering company now an organ of state? This line of
reasoning could be expanded to include any company that contracts
with the state to provide a service. Is the mere conclusion of a contract
with a state sufficient to render the contracting entity "public" for that
purpose?
It is possible to adopt an even more expansive conception of the
domain of the public. Every corporation is in fact constituted by laws
passed by the state in which it is incorporated. These laws also regulate
the operations of the corporation. Since the laws of the state enable the
very creation of corporate entities, it is arguable that all such entities
are in fact created by the public sphere and thus are part of the state
itself. Such reasoning challenges the entire division between a "private
corporate sphere" and a "public state sphere."
Such reasoning could be extended even further. The domain of law
does not only regulate corporations. It also specifically determines the
background rules in terms of which all individuals live and conducts
their lives. Whilst individuals have a clear existence independent of the
state, their daily actions and abilities are constrained and enabled by
the state. We could thus argue that individuals too are essentially "part"
of the state and have obligations to one another as a result.
This reasoning, in some sense, appears to constitute a reduction ad
absurdum: the state will encompass everything affected by it. Moreover,
PROVINCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW vii (Michael Taggart ed., 1997); Geoff Budlender,
Faculty of Law, University of Stellenbosch, 20 Years of Democracy: The State of Human
Rights in South Africa (Oct. 2, 2014), available at http://blogs.sun.ac.za/law/files/
2014/10/Annual-Human-Rights-Lecture-2014-Adv-GBudlender-SC.pdf;
Meghan
Finn,
Organs of State: An Anatomy, 31 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 631 (2015) (discussing when private
entities constitute an organ of state).
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if individuals are part of the state, then the very notion of obligations in
relation to fundamental rights becomes problematic: ultimately, an
obligation of the state towards an individual will be an obligation of the
state towards itself. Such a result would be normatively undesirable in
that it would start abstracting from the real reasons for rights
protection: that individuals are distinct entities with distinct interests
who are not subsumed by any entity such as the state. The notion of
state obligations to itself would obscure the key normative issues
involved.
The logic of attempting to capture the obligations of nonstate actors
for fundamental rights through expanding the conception of the state
could well lead to this absurd result of including every agent within the
domain of the state. If a more reasonable model were to be adopted
which drew the line less expansively, then a justification would need to
be provided as to why the boundaries of the state only extend so far and
no further. What is necessary is an account of the nature and functions
of particular entities, and whether they share some of the chief
characteristics of the state.

IV. RECONCEIVING THE "PUBLIC": CORPORATIONS AS PARTIALLY PUBLIC
ENTITIES

A brief sketch of a less expansive model will demonstrate the
undesirability of collapsing the corporate sphere into the state. In order
to do so, we need to draw on an account of the nature of the state itself
and its underlying justification. I will rely on social-contract theory,
rooted in the idea that the state is formed by a social contract between
those who live within it, which grants the state legitimacy to pass laws
and regulations and exercise powers of enforcement over others. This
idea has a long history. Hobbes famously imagined a state of nature
where, in the absence of a sovereign power, individuals live in a state of
34
war against one another that renders life "nasty, brutish and short."
To avoid such a situation, individuals consent to the existence of a
sovereign power in order to attain a state of peace between them, to
35
preserve their own lives, and to "be protected against other men."
Locke has a different vision of the state of nature, but it is similar to
Hobbes's in one crucial respect: in the state of nature, individuals lack
an impartial body to adjudicate disputes and to enforce the settlements

34. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 89 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991)
(1651).
35. Id. at 92, 120-21.
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arrived at. 36 It is necessary to form a neutral body that exercises an
impartial adjudicatory and enforcement power between people and is
constrained by the need to protect the natural rights of life, liberty, and
property. 37 On both views, it is important to recognize that the
individual is (at least initially) primary and contracts into the state.
Moreover, both views (though to different degrees) place limitations on
the power of the state. For Hobbes, the individual may resist any
command to "kill, wound or mayme himself; or not to resist those that
assault him; or to abstain from the use of food, ayre, medicine, or any
other thing, without which he cannot live"; 38 for Locke, the state cannot
39
imperil an individual's life, liberty, or property.
Both these ideas are connected to the notion that one of the key
reasons for the existence of the state is to ensure the peaceful enjoyment
by individuals of certain fundamental rights. The state is empowered to
develop laws that are impartial between persons, and must be founded
on the idea that each individual is of equal importance. 40 The equal
importance of individuals requires that the most important interests
implicated in securing their "worth" or "importance" be protected. 41 Part
of the very justification for the state itself is the state's power to ensure
that the relationships between private parties do not violate the
fundamental rights of others, conform to certain basic standards, and do
not imperil the material well-being of other individuals.4 2 Individuals
thus grant the state the powers of regulation and enforcement to the
extent necessary to ensure the realization of their fundamental rights.
The state's very raison d 'tre involves regulating the relationship
36. See LOCKE, supra note 4, para. 13, at 275 ("[It is unreasonable for Men to be
Judges in their own Cases.").
37. See id. at para. 123, at 350 ("[Man in the State of Nature] seeks out.., to unite for
the mutual Preservation of their Lives, Liberties and Estates, which I call by the general
name, Property").
38. HOBBES, supra note 34, at 151.
39. See LOCKE, supra note 4 ("[T]he power of the Society, or Legislative constituted by
them, can never be suppos'd to extend farther than the common good.").
40. See

RONALD DWORKIN,

SOVEREIGN

VIRTUE:

THE THEORY

AND PRACTICE OF

EQUALITY 1 (2000) ("No government is legitimate that does not show equal concern for the
fate of all those citizens over whom it claims dominion and from whom it claims
allegiance.").
41. See BILCHITZ, supra note 9, at 64-65.
42. It should be recognized that neither of these social contract theories supports the
idea that states should simply abstain from interfering with private parties as some
recent libertarian theorists argue. The very reason for the existence of the state provides
grounds for the prevention of harm, but also for protecting individuals from private
violence and ensuring that individuals have a certain level of material well-being, which
may itself require interference with the property rights of others. See, e.g., ROBIN L. WEST,
RE-IMAGINING JUSTICE 84-85 (2003).
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between private parties inter se to ensure that they live together in such
a way that the rights of each are realized (to the extent possible).
This reasoning has important implications for fundamental rights
and the role of the state. It is evident from social-contract theory that
the state is not the "originator" of obligations in relation to fundamental
rights (as was suggested by the indirect duty model). On the contrary,
such obligations are its very reason for coming into being. Central to
this argument is the idea that the state is an entity that is wholly public
in nature: its foundation and legitimacy lie in its impartiality and its
treatment of each individual with equal importance. As such, the state
is not meant to disclose preferences for the interests of particular
persons, but must exercise its powers in a general way for the purposes
it was formed without disclosing favoritism or bias to any particular
person. 43 In this way, the state can achieve the goals social-contract
theorists had in mind for it: preserving the peace between people and
creating an impartial enforcement arm to adjudicate disputes between
44
persons.
If this wholly public nature is the key characteristic of the state,
then not all entities and individuals can be assimilated into the
structure of the state itself. The state should not act in ways that favor
the interests of particular persons, but individuals within a society are
of course permitted to do so (within certain constraints). How then are
we to conceive of corporations? I contend that they must be understood
as entities with a dual nature: from the point of view of the state, the
reason it enables corporations to be founded in law must be that such an
entity will bring positive benefits to the society. There is thus a social
purpose at the heart of the corporation. 45 However, that social purpose

43. This view has garnered widespread support by philosophers, although it is given
different justifications. See, e.g., AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 17-18 (1992) ("A
theory may accept ...inequality .... but in defending those inequalities it would be hard
to duck the need to relate them, ultimately, to equal consideration for all in some
adequately substantial way."); Ronald Dworkin, Comment on Narveson: In Defense of
Equality, 1 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 24, 33 (1983).
44. As we have seen, these represent the views of Hobbes and Locke. See generally,
HOBBES, supra note 34; LOCKE, supra note 4.
45. See, famously, E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?,
45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1148 (1932). But see, A. A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers
in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1074 (1931) (arguing that "all powers granted to a
corporation ... are necessarily and at all times exercisable only for the ratable benefit of
all the shareholders" - a position from which Berle, who would later accept Dodd's view,
would cease to argue); Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to
Increase its Profits, in ETHIcAL THEORY AND BUSINESS 51 (Tom L. Beauchamp et a., eds.,
8th ed. 2009) (opining that a corporation has no social responsibility to the public; the
shareholders drive the corporation's social responsibility). It is hard, though, to see how
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is to be realized in a particular way: the state enables individuals to
form an entity with distinct characteristics-separate legal personality,
limited liability, and perpetual succession 46-for reasons relating to
their own self-interest. Individuals form corporations as a vehicle to
maximize their own benefits, in particular by limiting their liability
against the risks of doing business. The underlying idea is that
individuals may be prepared to take more risks and innovate more if
they are not exposed to the possibility of personal insolvency.
Individuals are thus empowered to conduct business for their own selfinterest in a manner that is meant to have positive and beneficial social
effects. The corporation is thus a vehicle for individual entrepreneurship
and self-interest to be harmonized with public social and economic
goals. 47 The corporation is to be understood in this way as a "partially
private, partially public" entity. To insist that corporations are simply
public entities without recognizing their private dimension is to fail to
capture the very nature of the entity in question, and could well
frustrate the very beneficial social effects they are meant to have. At the
same time, to contend that the corporation is entirely private in nature
fails to recognize the important social purpose behind its creation, and
its entanglement in a web of relations and effects that do not simply
impact upon the owners of the corporation.
If corporations were simply a part of the state, then they would be
subject to all the obligations that the state has. Thus, we would
legitimately ask the question whether corporations had duties to
provide the infrastructure for voting, to ensure an effective criminal
justice system, and to provide health care for all. 48 It may be responded
that this is absurd and would not necessarily be entailed by recognizing
corporations as part of the state: just as different parts of the state have
different functions and obligations, so too could corporations and their

the state could legitimately enable the creation of an entity if there were no social purpose
to its creation.
46. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, What is Corporate Law?, in THE
ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 7, 7 (Reinier

Kraakman et al. eds., 2004).
47. See David Bilchitz, Do Corporations Have Positive Fundamental Rights
Obligations?, 57 THEORIA 1, 9-11 (2010) (describing the dual nature of the corporate
entity and its implications for the positive obligations of corporations in relation to
fundamental rights); see also FLORIAN WETTSTEIN, MULTI-NATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND
GLOBAL JUSTICE: HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF A QUASI-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATION

324-25 (2009) (describing ways in which corporations should help the world's poor gain
access to basic infrastructure, facilitate the creation of effective social policies, and engage
with the provision of public goods and social services).
48. For an articulation of this worry, see JOHN GERARD RUGGIE, JUST BUSINESS:
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 51 (2013).
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distinctness be captured in this way. 49 Yet, clearly, such a view would
require an account of why corporations have particular obligations and
not others. Conceiving of them as entirely public in nature causes
particular problems for this project. One of the key distinctions between
corporations and the state is that corporations are entitled to act in a
partial way to further their own interests, as opposed to always having
to act in the general interest. Whilst constraints may be placed upon the
extent to which a corporation can act in its self-interest, and whilst it
may be required to contribute to the general weal, one of the key
reasons underlying the creation of the corporation is to enable the
individual self-interest underlying its creation ultimately to have social
benefits. To conceptualize the corporation as fundamentally public in
nature fails to capture a part of its essential nature, namely, that its
very existence arises from the fact that private motives can create
50
public benefits.
Moreover, part of the reason for distinguishing between the public
and the private in liberal political theory lies in the idea that the private
sphere is one in which individuals may have a certain level of autonomy
to determine the course of their own lives. It is recognized that
individuals may legitimately pursue their own ends (within certain
constraints) and that this is the hallmark of a free society. 51 They need
not always operate neutrally, impartially, or with a public purpose in
mind; these are characteristics of the public sphere. The corporation
was conceived as a vehicle for individuals to pursue their business
interests, which would otherwise have been pursued through other
forms (such as sole proprietorships or partnerships). The success of the
corporate form lies in the particular advantages it offers individuals in
their entrepreneurial activities: limited liability and perpetual
succession, for instance, have significant benefits for shareholders that
are not available in other business forms. It is also legitimate to
recognize the fact that the corporation itself is created through law,

49. One of the worries here is that the blurring could lead the state to attempt to avoid
realizing its own obligations and seek to transfer them to the corporate sphere
undermining "domestic political incentives to make governments more responsive and
responsible to their own citizenry." Id. at 52.

50. Capitalist economic theory suggests that a market consisting of rational and selfinterested individuals with an adequate level of competition will naturally allocate
resources efficiently. Effectively, a competitive market will ensure that capital will be
directed to those enterprises that produce products for which the public has demand. In
this way, the public benefits by being able to purchase desired products at the lowest
possible price whilst ensuring that producers remain profitable. See DAVID BEGG ET AL.,

ECONOMIcs 260-1 (8th ed. 2005) (explaining economic concepts of perfect competition and
Pareto efficiency).
51. JOHN RAWLS, POLITIcAL LIBERALISM 30 (1993).
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which renders it more public in nature than the other forms of business
enterprise. At the same time, it does not fundamentally lose its
character as an entity that individuals employ to express their
autonomy in the sphere of business. As such, space must be preserved
for the exercise of this autonomy separate from collective and public
goals. To collapse the public and private spheres would be to subsume
the individual into the collective rather than to preserve the complex
interplay between the two, which is characteristic of the corporate
entity.
V. CONCLUSION: FUNDAMENTAL-RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS BEYOND THE
STATE

In Parts II and III, I discussed the shortcomings of two models
through which international law might impose duties on corporate
actors, and which attempt to preserve its traditional state-based focus.
The "indirect duty" model fails conceptually and practically to preserve
the primacy and universality of rights by reifying the state as the sole
addressee and "originator" of fundamental-rights obligations. The
"expanded state" model attempts to recognize that entities other than
the state can indeed have wider public responsibilities in relation to
fundamental rights, but it does so by eliding the distinction between the
state and those other entities.
What causes the problem in these models is the attempt to retain
the view that the state is the sole agent responsible for realizing
fundamental rights. I argue that the logic of fundamental rights
essentially requires dispensing with this assumption and allowing the
beneficiary of rights to become the focus, with all agents capable of
violating such rights as potential bearers of obligations with respect to
them. For the effective allocation of obligations, we need a model that
can recognize the distinctive nature of the agents that can impact upon
fundamental rights. The very nature of these agents may provide good
reasons why they should have obligations in relation to fundamental
rights. My focus in this paper has been on the corporation, although the
reasoning may be applicable to some other nonstate actors.
As I argued in Part IV, it is important to recognize the dual
character of the corporation. It is an entity created through law with the
goal of achieving social benefits (its "public dimension"); yet the entity
itself is successful only insofar as it retains an ability to express
individual self-interest and autonomy in conducting business in the best
way possible to ensure satisfactory profits (its "private dimension"). Any
adequate attempt to conceptualize the obligations of the corporate entity
must do justice to these two features.
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The public dimension of the corporation compels the conclusion that
it has some obligations in relation to fundamental rights. Since it is an
entity created for purposes of achieving social benefits, and created
through law, it must not harm the most fundamental constitutional
entitlements enshrined in law, which guide the very legal system itself.
In this regard, the corporation can be recognized to have negative
obligations. It may also be required to act in specific ways so as to
achieve these goods; in this regard, it may have positive obligations as
well. The private dimension of the corporation, however, places
constraints on how much may be required of it. If it were permanently
to become a loss-making entity acting in the public interest, then its
"private" character would be lost and the corporation would be
subsumed into the state. 52 We thus see that it is not only the potential
impact of corporate activities on fundamental rights but also the very
nature of the corporate form that justifies the recognition that it bears
obligations in this regard.
Such a multi-agent model of obligations may be depicted as follows:

State
Corporation

Individual

_

7-/

Individual
Fig. 3: Multi-agent model of fundamental rights obligations
On this model, the individual is primary and all agents have some
obligations towards individuals in relation to fundamental rights.
Importantly, this model does not permit a firm distinction between
"private" and "public" entities, although it recognizes that the state, the

52. For a further discussion of these ideas, see Bilchitz, supra note 47, at 23-26.
Determining the exact boundary of what may be required by the "public" dimension of a
corporation lies beyond the scope of this paper, which simply aims to demonstrate the fact
that such obligations exist.
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corporation, and the individual are distinct agents and entities with
distinct obligations. It is important to understand why this is so.
Being an entity with obligations in relation to fundamental rights
has a number of important consequences. It means that the entity in
question is not entitled in all circumstances to privilege its own selfinterest over others and must seek to consider its effect on the rights of
others as placing important constraints on what it may do. In this
sense, any entity that has direct rights obligations cannot be wholly selfregarding and has a duty to consider its impact on fundamental rights
in an impartial manner. This kind of reasoning would usually be
characteristic of what is required of the state; however, the potential for
an impact on fundamental rights renders a private entity-at least in
that respect-partially public. At times, there may be a conflict between
its private and public dimensions. Decisionmaking procedures common
in public law such as a proportionality enquiry may be necessary to
determine whether the private interests would provide legitimate
53
reasons to restrict the rights of others.
This reasoning suggests that there is a continuum of what is often
taken to be characteristic of the public: impartial consideration of the
interests of all parties with legitimate interests. At the same time, in
relation to some agents, autonomy and self-interest are legitimate bases
upon which they may act, and thus not all of their actions need be
guided by the demands of impartiality. Each agent contains in itself an
element of the "public" as conceived in this manner, although to
differing degrees. This is what renders the "expanded state" model
attractive yet ultimately flawed: its failure to recognize that some
entities need not wholly be guided by impartial considerations.
If the domain of the public-impartiality, rights, obligations, and
distributive justice-is not the sole preserve of the state, what is the
implication of this conception for the state's distinctive role?
Importantly, as I argued, in relation to nonstate actors, the "public" is a
matter of degree; the state, however, has no dimension that is
legitimately characterized as "private."54 Thus, the state is no longer to
53. For an attempt to articulate such an approach, see David Bilchitz & Laura

Ausserlandscheider Jonas, Proportionality, Fundamental Rights and the Duties of
Directors,OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 2016).
54. The state in recent years has formed private corporate entities (public enterprises)
that often operate in a manner more characteristic of private corporate entities: in South
Africa, these include the airline, South African Airways, and the transport authority,
Transnet. There may of course be a legitimate question as to whether the state should be
involved in a particular sector. Once it is decided that the state should be involved,
however, the entity may operate according to certain business principles but, ultimately,
its goal must be public in nature, seeking to advance the interests of all in a particular
political community.
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be conceived of as the only public entity but as the only wholly public
entity. The state may not legitimately take the private interests of any
particular grouping as a purpose it seeks to achieve. Rather, its
foundation lies in impartiality and the treatment of each individual
with equal importance. Similarly, the state may only legitimately seek
to limit fundamental rights for purposes that are fundamentally public
and that will seek to benefit all individuals within its domain. The
wholly public nature of the state provides a justification for its
regulatory power as well as a constraint on the operation of such power.
The fact that the state is mandated to govern impartially in the
interests of all individuals within its domain means that it has the
authority to pass laws that all can reasonably accept. The state may
thus recognize the obligations of other actors as well, but it does so not
as the "originator" of these obligations, but rather as the institution best
placed to ensure their public recognition and institutionalization by
performing its role as the legitimate enforcer of public obligations. 55 The
state thus retains a unique character and role in protecting
fundamental rights, even though the domain of agents with public
human rights obligations is expanded.
Close examination of fundamental rights requires a rethinking of
the sharp boundaries that are often drawn in international and
domestic law between the public and the private. The very idea of rights
requires a conception of the obligations of agents that is not artificially
restricted, but focused on the primacy of ensuring that individuals'
fundamental interests are realized. Indeed, this rather basic idea has
important implications for the agents, institutions, and structures we
create around us. In turn, a focus on these obligations requires us to
think very carefully about the distinctive nature of each of these agents,
which will in turn have implications for the allocation of obligations
between them. I argue that there is a continuum between the public and
the private nature of these agents, with many having a dual nature.
This rather complex picture challenges our traditional taxonomies and,
55. I only here consider the "public" nature of the state in relation to those within its
territory; arguably, at the international level, states may act to pursue the self-interest of
those who lie within its domain. See Onora O'Neill, Bounded and Cosmopolitan Justice, 26
REV. INT'L. STUD. 45, 51 (2000), for a discussion of Rawls' conception of states as inevitably
condemned to pursuing rational self-interest. In certain law and economics literature, the
state is also, sometimes, conceived as a "corporation" with its citizens as "shareholders"
within that corporation. See JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAw 5 (2005) ("[S]tate interests can be identified . . . . and through
various domestic institutions states can and do maintain their corporate identity."). See
generally ANDREW T. GUZMAN, How INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS (2008) (applying rational
choice assumptions to state action and compliance within international law to
demonstrate that states "seek to maximize their own gains or payoffs").
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more importantly, places the realization of fundamental rights as being
at the core of what international law should be about. As such, it affords
the opportunity to recognize the particularities of differing agents and
their role in realizing fundamental rights, and to adopt increasingly
effective modalities to realize them.

